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Abstract 
This paper implements both stochastic production and cost frontier analyses to estimate 
the efficiency of toll motorway companies in Spain, the country with the largest number 
of private concessionaires in this economic sector. Our dataset includes 32 
concessionaires with different features for a time span of 26 years (1988-2014). The 
results support the existence of scale and density economies, showing that an increase in 
vehicle-kilometers is more important for cost efficiency than extending the motorway. 
The differences between transient and persistent efficiency are significant, so that we can 
test for regulatory and ownership differences. The price cap regulation seems to increase 
management technical efficiency. Regional governments grant better projects than central 
governments and, as shareholders, they also perform better. However, their performance 
is not significantly differently from that of full private concessionaires. We also find 
limited evidence of efficiency gains from privatization. These results help us provide new 
insights to evaluate policy and regulatory reforms aimed at enhancing technical efficiency 
in the sector.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Road transport is a major means of transportation with a significant influence on all areas 
of economic, political and social development since earliest times. Indeed, its role in 
public infrastructure investments and its link with economic growth, productivity and 
employment have been extensively studied, most notably in the economic literature since 
Aschauer (1989).1 However, beyond their obvious economic impact, roads have been at 
the heart of transportation, mobility and communication from Roman times, and they 
continue to be so with the growing provision of high capacity motorway infrastructure 
(Albalate, 2014). Road transport today is dominant among transport modes: in terms of 
total passenger-km, its share in 2014 (latest available data) stood at 82.2 and 86.4% in the 
European Union and the United States, respectively. In the case of freight, the modal split 
also favored road transport accounting for 49.0% of all transport modes in the EU in 2013 
(latest available data) and for 74.9% of total inland freight transport (based on tonne-
kilometers performed) (European Commission, 2016). In the US, the tonne-km share 
moved by road was slightly lower (47.8%), but still much higher than that moved by the 
second most important mode, rail (28%). Road transport also has a huge influence in 
developing countries, whose railway networks are often undergoing a sharp decline and 
which typically lack other types of transport infrastructure. In short, roads have become 
their main axis of mobility (see Hilling, 1996; ADB, 2015).   
Given these figures and the resources mobilized to build, maintain and operate this 
infrastructure, high capacity roads (motorways, expressways, highways, etc.)2 clearly 
play a key role in our economy, which makes their efficient management essential. Yet, 
very little is known about the efficiency and productivity of motorway management. In 
some countries, the motorway network is managed directly by the State (or by a publicly 
owned corporation operating under private law), while in others, private companies 
                                                 
1 See Matas, Raymond and Roig (2015) for recent studies on the link between road investments and 
productivity; See Jiwattanakulpaisarn et al. (2009) and Albalate and Fageda (2015) for recent studies on 
the link between motorways and employment.  
2 As in Albalate (2014, p. 10), we define motorways as “a road that has been specially designed and 
constructed for motor traffic, and which is provided, except at special points or temporarily, with separate 
carriageways for the two directions of traffic, separated from each other either by a dividing strip not 
intended for traffic or, exceptionally, by other means”. In English, several terms might be used to define 
such high-capacity roads: expressways, freeways, superhighways, parkways, highways, thruways, 
motorways, etc. 
2 
 
manage the motorways under concession contracts, especially when they are tolled as a 
return on their investment, maintenance and operation. These Public-Private Partnership 
contracts are designed and awarded in the expectation of improving efficiency and 
facilitating private financing, above all, in the hope of encouraging the collaboration of 
the private sector in the management of this capital-intensive infrastructure.3 However, 
toll regulation is usually unrelated to the degree of productivity or efficiency of the 
concessionaires (Albalate, Bel and Fageda, 2009), especially if price-cap regulation is not 
implemented (Iossa, 2015),4 and satisfying uncertain demand in the long run is the main 
factor determining the outcome of the standard fixed-term concession contract (Engel, 
Fischer and Galetovic, 1997; 2001).5 Even if motorway managers seem to have little 
scope for improving their overall cost efficiency given the overriding importance of 
capital costs (investment) in their cost structure, or they “can do little to increase 
demand”, as Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2002, p. 22) claim, the empirical literature 
remains scarce and overly limited to allow us to draw any general conclusions regarding 
efficient management and its determinants. 
Analyses of the efficiency of regulated industries such as energy systems (Lin and Wang, 
2014; Chen, Pestana and Borges, 2015; Ghosh and Kathuria, 2016) or water services 
(Phillips, 2013; Carvalho and Cunha-Marques, 2016), transport services, including buses 
( Filippini, Koller and Massiero, 2015;  Bel and Rosell, 2016)and railroads (Couto and 
Graham, 2009) or transport infrastructures such as ports (Cullinane et al., 2006;Yan, Sun 
and Liu, 2009) and airports (Martin and Voltes-Dorta, 2011) have figured among the most 
frequent applications of frontier modeling. Recently, efficiency analyses have begun to 
distinguish between transient and persistent inefficiency, where the latter absorbs 
structural problems in the firm or systematic shortfalls in management, and the former is 
a time variant component that absorbs changes in a firm’s efficiency. Yet, the empirical 
literature has failed to pay sufficient attention to the distinction between these two 
                                                 
3Geltner and Moavenzadeh (1987) identified four potential economic justifications for privatizing 
motorways: higher revenues without higher taxes, improved highway use efficiency, production efficiency 
of maintenance, and quality of highway services.  
4Banded rate of return, inflation adjustments and traffic fluctuation adjustments are some of the most 
common toll adjustment regulations that are unrelated to efficiency incentives.   
5Some determinants of motorway demand beyond the control of the concessionaire include fuel prices, 
macroeconomic conditions, population growth, per capita income distribution, the existence of alternative 
cheaper roads or modes of transportation, changes in urbanization and land use, weather conditions and 
transportation technical change (Yescombe, 2007; Albalate, 2014; Iossa, 2015) 
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components of a firm’s efficiency (Filippini and Greene, 2016). Recent analyses have 
focused on energy efficiency (Filippini and Hunt, 2015), banking (Mamatzakis et al., 
2015) and the nursing home sector (Di Giorgio et al., 2015). All emphasize the importance 
of distinguishing between these two types of efficiency for policy analysis. Moreover, the 
literature dedicated to studying the efficiency of public utilities has largely neglected the 
motorway industry with just a few specific exceptions, most notably Benfratello, Iozzi 
and Valbonessi (2009) for Italy, and Odeck (2008) and Welde and Odeck (2011) for 
Norway.  
This paper contributes to the literature by applying production and cost frontier models 
to the evaluation of the efficiency of toll motorway companies. We specifically study 
transient and persistent efficiency estimations as they allow us to isolate the sources of 
inefficiency when evaluating such public policies as regulatory and ownership reform. 
We use a new, self-constructed dataset for Spain, the country with the largest number of 
private concessionaires (for-profit) and with a longstanding tradition of public-private 
partnerships in this infrastructure sector (Albalate, 2014).6,7 A timespan of 26 years, 
covering the period 1988–2014, allows us to evaluate the efficiency of concessionaires 
during distinct periods (i.e. of economic growth and recession), and to take into 
consideration different regulatory changes (price cap schemes, privatizations, etc.) and 
different features of motorways (length, expansions, physical features, technological 
advances, etc.) that might have impacted on concessionaire efficiency. Thus, this paper 
is the first to evaluate cost and production stochastic frontiers for the same national toll 
motorway network, focusing on both sides of the efficiency phenomenon. Moreover, it 
does so for the longest period and with the largest sample of companies used to date in 
the literature of this kind. 
                                                 
6 The first toll motorway private concessions were awarded in 1967, during the dictatorship of Francisco 
Franco. He initiated a first wave of network construction under a PPP scheme of concession contracts, in 
which private companies, created as joint ventures, were responsible for building, maintaining and 
operating these new high capacity roads. These companies retained the right to charge tolls to users for a 
period of time established in the concession contract (typically around 30 years).  
7 Note Norway has more toll collection companies but they are non-profit limited responsibility companies 
established by local governments.  
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the related 
literature on the efficiency of motorways. In section 3, we outline our technical approach 
by presenting the model implemented for both cost and production efficiency analyses. 
Our results are presented and discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 provides our main 
conclusions and policy recommendations.     
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on the efficiency of motorway management is scant. To the best of our 
knowledge, only two experiences of toll road concessions are examined in the literature: 
Norway and Italy. In the first, efficiency was first estimated by Amdal et al. (2007) and 
Odeck (2008). Since concessionaires are public companies under the ownership of the 
local authorities, the Norwegian case is unusual. As Estache and de Rus (2000) highlight, 
it uses dedicated non-profit companies to collect tolls, while the government road 
administration retains responsibility for road design, construction and maintenance (see 
Odeck, 2008).8 This makes Norway quite a unique case and one that is readily compared 
with other international experiences.  
Amdal et al. (2007) use panel data for 26 toll collection companies – including some toll 
cordons – with a time series that extends between two and seven years (1998 to 2004). 
They find evidence of important unexploited economies of scale in costs when estimating 
a translog cost function for traffic and other controls with a random effects estimator. 
Average costs were reported as being decreasing in traffic volume for low levels until 
they became flat for high-density traffic. Other controls, such as the number of lanes, 
competitive tendering and total debt, also provided interesting results. An increase in the 
number of lanes and total debt were both positively correlated with operating costs. 
However, the former appeared to be especially sensitive – probably due to its correlation 
with traffic – to model specification, becoming insignificant in the simplest models. In 
contrast, competitive tendering and the number of cars with on board paying units did 
                                                 
8 The Norwegian Public Roads Administration is responsible for planning, building and operating the road 
projects financed by toll money and for planning and building the toll collection systems. For each toll 
project, a dedicated toll company with limited responsibility is established by the local authorities, in order 
to operate the road toll system and to handle financial tasks.  
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decrease operating costs, which points to the importance of regulation and technological 
advances in toll collecting systems.  
Odeck (2008) also evaluated this experience but employed a different methodological 
approach, namely, a non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) to assess input 
technical inefficiency. The sample comprised 18 companies over a timespan of four years 
(2001-2004).  Results also confirmed the potential for efficiency gains (of about 14%) 
and the existence of economies of scale, with larger companies being more efficient than 
their smaller counterparts. New electronic methods of collecting tolls seem to contribute 
to efficiency improvements, but represent sizable investments in the short run. Another 
result worth mentioning is the role of company age, found to be positively associated with 
efficiency. 
Later, Welde and Odeck (2011) expanded their DEA to include a stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) for a production function. This study examined a six-year period (2003-
2008) and considered 20 toll companies. The main finding once again was the significant 
potential for efficiency improvements and further evidence of the importance of 
technology advances in toll collection. Their results confirmed that electronic tolling is a 
source of efficiency gains with respect to manual toll collection. The introduction of this 
technology not only allows companies to reduce their costs but it enables them to be more 
efficient in their operations. The age of the toll company appears to be sensitive to the 
method used, given that it is significant according to SFA, but not according to DEA. 
However, the authors report the absence of economies of scale (contradicting the evidence 
presented in Odeck, 2008), a result that is consistent irrespective of the method applied. 
The paper’s findings also contradict the results of Amdal et al. (2007) with regard to the 
contribution of competitive tendering, although the efficiency considered by the latter 
authors was based on average costs rather than on a production function.  
The second experience to have been evaluated by the literature is the Italian motorway 
sector. Some early studies on productivity and operating efficiency were somewhat 
limited from a technical perspective and focused on the impact of privatization. Ragazzi 
(2008) found evidence of economies of scale, although the study links this result to the 
importance of Autostrade (the country’s leading privatized concessionaire in what is a 
small sample), and the fact that its operation costs were much lower than the industry 
mean. Massiani and Ragazzi (2008) provide findings on the relationship between 
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privatization and efficiency. They report no statistically significant impact of the 
privatization of the network on productivity, finding no evidence that the privatization of 
Autostrade improved efficiency. The authors consider the use of productivity ratios based 
on traffic with respect to costs, or on traffic revenues with respect to total costs, as being 
invalid. Rather, they claim that productivity should be assessed by means of the sole 
consideration of operating costs, since amortization and financial costs depend upon 
historical investment costs and the length of the concession. Here, they found that 
operating costs largely depended on traffic and capacity, but they found no clear evidence 
of economies of scale. 
A more technical, in-depth analysis of the Italian toll motorway sector was performed by 
Benfratello, Iozzi and Valbonesi (2009). This was the first paper to study a stochastic cost 
frontier function for the motorway sector. Their sample included 20 Italian 
concessionaires and a timespan of 13 years (1992-2004). Italy’s experience is much more 
similar to that of Spain, with a large presence of private companies and, this makes it the 
closest paper to ours. Their empirical analysis based on SFA for a cost function concludes 
that the industry clearly exhibits scale economies for small- and medium-sized 
concessionaires operating in the Italian network. An equiproportional increase in traffic 
and network size causes a less than proportional increase in costs for networks up to 300 
km. Besides scale economies, the authors also find large density economies and steady 
productivity gains over time. Interestingly, the authors find that privately owned 
concessionaires have a cost advantage of about 3 per cent over their publicly owned 
counterparts. By contrast, the introduction of a price cap – which in theory should serve 
as a productivity-enhancing mechanism – did not have any effect on efficiency. 
Unfortunately, given the nature of their dataset, they could not establish the size of the 
network at which the economies of scale are exhausted.  
3. THE MODEL 
The estimation of frontier functions is the econometric exercise of making the empirical 
implementation consistent with the underlying theoretical proposition that no observed 
agent can exceed the ideal (Greene, 2008). In practice, the frontier function model is a 
regression model that allows efficiency to be measured, that is, an empirical estimation 
of the extent to which firms achieve a theoretical ideal. Only a few firms typically manage 
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to operate at this frontier. Measuring the resulting inefficiency is the ultimate goal of 
stochastic frontier analysis.  
There are two approaches to estimating the frontier and measuring efficiency: parametric 
and non-parametric approaches. The parametric approach requires that the frontier 
functional and inefficiency form should be imposed, while in the non-parametric 
approach there are no functional form impositions. Frontier approaches do not necessarily 
observe the true (unobserved) technological frontier, only the best-practice reference 
technology. However, a non-parametric approach, such as DEA, does not distinguish 
between technical inefficiency and random noise. Here, the use of frontier models has 
become widespread for different reasons: First, either production or cost frontier behavior 
is consistent with economic theory of optimizing; second, deviation from the optimal 
frontier can be measured, which implies, in third place, that this deviation can have policy 
implications. The estimation of efficiency by the implementation of different models, 
therefore, seeks to identify which factors affect a firm’s efficiency. 
Parametric approaches can be subdivided into deterministic and stochastic models. 
Deterministic models allow the researcher to distinguish between technical efficiency and 
statistical noise, while the stochastic approach takes in to consideration both technical 
efficiency and random noise. On a stochastic frontier, one company can usually be 
assumed to operate at the efficiency level. Farrell (1957) was the first to measure 
productive efficiency empirically. This efficiency is evaluated by comparing best firm 
practice with the rest. In conclusion, the possibility of obtaining firm-specific estimates 
of efficiency has greatly enhanced the appeal and expansion of stochastic frontier 
analysis. 
3.1. The cost function 
The stochastic cost frontier (Aigner et al., 1977) is based on the idea that deviations from 
the cost “frontier” might not be entirely under the control of the firm. We adopt a 
stochastic cost frontier model for panel data in order to analyze the impact of different 
variables on a concessionaire’s total costs. The cost function gives the minimum 
expenditure needed to produce a given output. In the case before us, the purpose of a 
motorway concessionaire is to maximize the total distance covered by the vehicles, 
assuming total costs to be a function of input prices. Thus, a motorway concessionaire 
uses its employees as labor force and its investment in the motorway as capital. As such, 
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the cost frontier provides a standard against which to measure the performance of the 
producers for whom the variable cost minimization assumption is appropriate. Aigner et 
al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) propose the first estimation procedure 
for inefficiencies, an important derivative when estimating the frontier cost function. 
Based on previous studies, a cost function can be specified: 
   TC𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝑖𝑡, 𝑡𝑡)     
where the total cost of concessionaire firm TC is assumed to be a function of output Y, 
factor prices P (labor and maintenance L, and capital C), network characteristics N and a 
time trend 𝑡𝑡. In this sector, just what should constitute the network characteristics that 
account for differences between motorway concessionaries is open to debate. Motorway 
length is one characteristic that has an impact on total costs. The number of accidents 
with victims is potentially another relevant motorway characteristic, given that a 
concessionaire seeks to minimize such accidents because of their associated costs and 
because of the negative effect they have on user perceptions regarding safety. The total 
number of accidents could be a substitute for accidents with victims, but there is a 
discontinuity in the way these variables are defined in the period analyzed here. A third 
network characteristic is the number of customer claims registered, which constitutes a 
motorway quality approximation.  
The Cobb-Douglas and translog models overwhelmingly dominate the applications 
literature in stochastic frontier and econometric inefficiency estimation (Greene, 2008). 
The cost function should be non-negative, non-decreasing in input and output prices, 
linearly homogeneous and concave in input prices. We use a Cobb-Douglas (log-linear) 
cost function. The concavity assumption is automatically satisfied in the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The linear homogeneity restriction can be imposed by dividing input 
prices and total costs by the price of one input price. A translog functional form is also 
suitable, but after several attempts, there is no convergence and the coefficient parameters 
obtained are counterintuitive, such as a significantly negative sign on the output variable. 
This problem, described by Farsi et al. (2005), is perhaps caused by multicollinearity 
between the several interaction and second order coefficients. Imposing the appropriate 
curvature on a translog model is generally a challenging problem in the production and 
cost frontier.  
(1) 
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As a result, the stochastic cost frontier equation to be estimated can be expressed in the 
following double log form: 
ln
TCit
PCit
= β0 + βPLln
PLit
PCit
+ βYlnYit + βLEN ln LENit + βACC ln ACCit + +βCLA ln CLAit
+ βTTime_trendt + uit + υit 
with 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 32        𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1988, 1989, … , 2014  
where subscripts i and t denote the concessionaire firm and year, respectively. The total 
costs (TC) are the sum of labor, maintenance and capital costs, where the price of labor 
and maintenance (PL) and the price of capital (PC) are the two input factor prices. The 
output (Y) is the number of vehicle-kilometers. The network characteristics are the 
motorway length (LEN), the number of accidents with victims (ACC) and the number of 
customer claims (CLA). The random term is divided into a normally distributed error 
term υit and the non-negative inefficiency term uit following a truncated non-negative 
normal distribution 𝑁+(0, 𝜎𝑣
2). Between both terms, there is an independent distribution 
assumption. Estimating a cost frontier allows us to compare the performance of the model 
on two sides: the cost function coefficients and inefficiency. There is some evidence of a 
trade-off between the coefficients estimated and inefficiency. The fixed-effects models 
perform well in estimating the coefficients, but a degree of bias appears in the inefficiency 
estimates.  
The cost inefficiency measures how much a motorway concessionaire is able to reduce 
its costs while maintaining the same level of output. In a context in which demand is 
determined and cannot be stored, as is the case of the motorway sector, this is especially 
relevant. We can account for two sources of inefficiency: technical and allocative 
inefficiency. Technical efficiency can be achieved using fewer inputs for the same output 
level, whereas allocative efficiency can be achieved through a different input 
combination. Utilities were alleged to be wasting money on excessively capitalized 
facilities, so allocative efficiency refers to the extent to which the input choices fail to 
satisfy the marginal equivalences for cost minimization. In our case, it is difficult to 
achieve efficiency from the allocative perspective because it is difficult to change capital 
during a concession period after it has been assigned at the beginning. We use input- 
oriented inefficiency, that is, a concessionaire objective is to produce a given level of 
output with the minimum possible cost. This view is useful if the output, i.e. the vehicle-
(2) 
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kilometers, is exogenously given. After all, on the cost side, any errors in optimization, 
technical or allocative, must show up as higher costs.  
The first application of panel data models to stochastic frontier analysis was undertaken 
by Pitt and Lee (1981) in the form of a random effect model. To estimate the inefficiency 
term – one of the main aims in estimating this model, a two stage-approach is taken. The 
authors assume that the inefficiency term ui is constant in time and that it captures firm 
inefficiency; concessionaire specific inefficiency is the same in each time period. This 
might represent quite a strong assumption for a long panel, although it might be plausible 
when a firm operates in a non-competitive environment, such as that of motorway 
concessions. In a regulated industry, all firms might be operating under excess capacity, 
which could be reflected in high inefficiency values. Another limitation of this model is 
that no correlation is assumed between the explanatory variables and inefficiency. In these 
models, any individual-specific or unobserved heterogeneity is captured by the 
inefficiency term uior𝛼: the Pitt and Lee model (1981) underestimates the level of 
efficiency.  
The Pitt and Lee (1981) model cannot disentangle a firm’s inefficiency from cost 
differences due to the unobserved characteristics of the concession area. Usually, such 
companies cannot control for such concession characteristics as the terrain slope, viaducts 
or tunnels needed, etc., that cannot simply be attributed to concessionaire performance. 
To overcome this problem, Greene (2005a and 2005b) proposes a model that captures 
invariant unmeasured unobserved heterogeneity in a specific term, besides a firm-specific 
inefficiency term and a random noise term. The true fixed effects (TFE) model captures 
the unobserved heterogeneity in the cost function. In the true random effects (TRE) 
specification, unobserved cost differences across firms that remain constant over time are 
driven by unobserved characteristics rather than by inefficiency. The basic difference 
between the TFE and TRE models is that in the former any correlation between the effects 
and explanatory variables is allowed. Thus, time invariant inefficiency is interpreted as 
concessionaire specific heterogeneity, as it is not captured by the inefficiency term. This 
time invariant unobserved characteristic not absorbed by the inefficiency term is beyond 
the control of the concessionaire due to the concession characteristics.  
Recently, models have focused on separating productive efficiency into its persistent and 
transient parts. The initial implementation difficulties in the Colombi et al. (2011) 
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estimation procedure were solved on Colombi et al. (2014), Tsionas and Kumbhakar 
(2014), Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) and Filippini and Greene (2016). The 
persistent term is related to the presence of structural problems in the organization of the 
production process of a concessionaire or to the presence of systematic shortfalls in 
managerial capabilities. This cost inefficiency does not vary over time, and can be caused 
by structural problems in the motorway concession, by structural factors that have not 
been well allocated or by long-term management mistakes, among others. In contrast, the 
transient term is related to the presence of non-systematic management problems that can 
be solved in the short term. This is a more plausible assumption regarding concessionaire 
capabilities to reduce inefficiency – whereas a persistent inefficiency due to input 
allocations is difficult to remove, organizational changes or the elimination of short-run 
rigidities improves a concessionaire’s transient efficiency. This part is time varying, 
reflecting temporal management mistakes or temporal events affecting the concession. 
The Pitt and Lee (1981) model tends to reflect the persistent part of the time-invariant 
values. In Greene’s TRE and TFE models, any persistent component of the inefficiency 
is absorbed in the individual-specific constant term. In industries in which certain sources 
of efficiency result in time-invariant excess of inputs, the estimated inefficiency could be 
relatively small. Filippini and Greene (2015) find that the TRE model tends to estimate 
the transient part of efficiency, whereas the Pitt and Lee (1981) model does not capture 
persistent efficiency well. Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) propose a model that 
splits the error term in four components in order to capture these effects and to overcome 
Colombi et al.’s (2011) estimation difficulties.9 Total technical efficiency, therefore, can 
be obtained from the product of the persistent and transient technical efficiency terms.  
Summing up, in Table 1 we summarize the econometric specifications of the total cost 
stochastic frontier. The firm’s inefficiency is estimated using the conditional mean of the 
inefficiency term proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982) adapted to each model.  
  
                                                 
9This model can be implemented following Kumbhakar et al. (2015) 
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Table 1: Econometric specifications of the Stochastic Cost Frontier 
 Pitt and Lee 
(1981) 
True Fixed Effects 
(TFE) 
True Random Effects 
(TRE) 
Kumbhakar, Lien 
and Hardaker (KLH, 
2014)     
Model 𝑐𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
𝑐𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
𝑐𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
𝑐𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
Concessionaire 
component 
None (𝛼) 𝛼𝑖 𝛼 + 𝑤𝑖 
𝑤𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑤
2) 
𝛼 + 𝑤𝑖 
𝑤𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑤
2) 
Composed 
error  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
𝑢𝑖~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
𝜇𝑖  ~ 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝜇
2) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
Efficiency 𝐸[−𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖𝑡] 𝐸[−𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡] 𝐸[−𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡] Transient 𝐸[−𝑢𝑖|𝑢𝑖 +
𝑣𝑖𝑡] 
Persistent 𝐸[−𝜇𝑖|𝜇𝑖 +
𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡] 
 
A derivative from this approach is the possibility it affords of calculating the economies 
of density and scale. The economies of density are defined as the inverse of the elasticity 
of costs with respect to output; the relative increase in total costs resulting from an 
increase in vehicle-kilometers, holding input prices and the network characteristics fixed: 
𝐸𝐷 = (
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌
)
−1
=  (βY)
−1 
Economies of density (ED) imply that the average total costs of a motorway 
concessionaire fall as vehicle-kilometers increase. These economies exist if ED is greater 
than one; diseconomies of density are present for values less than one; while values equal 
(3) 
13 
 
to one indicate that the firm is operating at the optimal level, holding all other factors 
constant. 
Economies of scale (ES) measure the reaction recorded by total costs when the output 
and the network length increase in the same proportion, holding other network 
characteristics and input prices fixed: 
𝐸𝑆 = (
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌
+
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐸𝑁
)
−1
=  (βY + βLEN)
−1 
Thus, economies of scale exist if ES is greater than one, that is, the average total costs of 
a motorway concessionaire decrease as the vehicle-kilometers and motorway length 
increase in the same proportion, holding all other parameters constant. Economies of scale 
exist if ES is equal to one and diseconomies of scale exist if ES is less than one. It is 
important to assume that any increase in the network length raises the output level in the 
same proportion (Caves et al., 1984). 
 
3.2. The production function 
The production function assumes that each company seeks to maximize output from a 
given set of inputs. We suppose that motorway output can be described in terms of the 
production function: 
Y𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖𝑡, 𝐾𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝑖𝑡, 𝑡𝑡) 
where subscripts i= 1, 2, . . . , N refers to the concessionaire firm and t= 1, 2, . . . ,T  to 
the year. The total concessionaire output firm Y is assumed to be a function of inputs, 
including labor force L, the amount of capital K, the network conditions N and a time 
trend 𝑡𝑡.  
The concessionaire’s production objective is to ensure the maximum number of vehicles 
use the motorway and travel the maximum distance. Obtaining this output requires certain 
inputs. Capital represents the total investment in the motorway by the concessionaire each 
year. A large proportion of the total capital invested during the concession is invested in 
the first few years, but a non-negligible sum also has to be invested by the concessionaire 
in subsequent years to improve motorway conditions. A second input is the labor required 
(4) 
(5) 
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to carry out maintenance and to operate the toll collection system. Network length is 
directly related to the construction and maintenance costs and the use of the network is a 
key element in the scale and density economies of the infrastructure. This means the 
concessionaire has incentives to attract traffic. By improving motorway quality, the 
concessionaire can maximize the output given the large fixed and sunk costs associated 
with motorway construction. Other network condition variables include the number of 
accidents and the number of customer claims. A time trend is included to capture technical 
progress. Technical change refers to a change in the production technology associated 
with improved methods for using existing inputs. 
A particular transformation of production function 5 is that of the Cobb-Douglas function, 
and its stochastic frontier can be described as: 
ln Yit = β0 + βLlnLit + βKlnKit + βLON ln LENit + βACC ln ACCit + +βCLA ln CLAit +
βTTime_trendt-uit + υit 
with 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 32        𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡 = 1988, 1989, … , 2015  
where subscripts i and t denote the concessionaire firm and year, respectively. A 
supposition in the Cobb-Douglas function is that all observations share the same 
production technology. The composed error term is formed by uit and υit. The random 
variable υit is the idiosyncratic error component and is assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2), being either positive or negative. This term is 
independent of uit ,the one-sided non-negative random variable. Different distributional 
assumptions for uit are made in the different model specifications.  
In the production function we only have a technological relation, while in the cost 
function economic behavior emerges. A production firm is technically inefficient if a 
higher level of output is technically achievable for the same inputs (output-oriented) or if 
the observed output level can be produced with fewer inputs (input-oriented). A 
supposition in this model is that all firms share the same technology production function. 
This is a plausible assumption for the same country and for the same sector; however, in 
a cross-country or in a competitive environment comparison it is a much less plausible 
supposition. In our analysis, we do not discuss allocative efficiency, that is, whether the 
observed combination of inputs is the best.  
(6) 
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Using panel data allows us to disentangle persistent and time-varying inefficiency for 
firms, and to determine if the firms’ effects are fixed parameters or the realizations of a 
random variable. The same model specifications are used as in the cost function, namely, 
Pitt and Lee (1981), true fixed and true random effects models (Greene, 2005a and 2005b) 
and Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014). 
4. DATA 
The Spanish motorway industry forms part of the country’s national road network, 
providing public service infrastructure. The dataset used in this paper is extracted from 
the annual reports published by the Secretary-General of Infrastructure and Transport at 
the Spanish Ministry of Transportation. The first year included is 1988, given that in years 
prior to that date the majority of variables are unavailable. The result is an unbalanced 
data panel, where  the total number of observations through to 2014 is 437. In the initial 
years, between eight and ten companies are compared, while by the end of the period the 
number of concessionaires amounts to thirty-one. The dataset includes all of Spain’s 
tolled motorways, with the exception of some of the Basque country’s motorways for 
some years. The Basque foral regime (specific fiscal arrangements) means that public 
firms are under no obligation to report data to the central government. The sample, 
however, represents 96% of the total motorway observations. 
The information available for any given year includes total costs, structural costs, capital 
costs, vehicle-kilometers, number of employees, motorway lengths, number of accidents 
and customer claims. The cost function includes one output, two inputs, three network 
variables and a time trend. The production function includes two inputs and the same cost 
function variables: three network variables and a time trend. 
On the cost function side, the total cost (TC) is the dependent variable and includes labor, 
maintenance and capital costs.10 The price of labor and maintenance (PL) is given by the 
ratio between total salaries and motorway maintenance costs, on the one hand, and the 
                                                 
10All costs are adjusted for inflation using the Spanish CPI, measured in 2002 euros. Before 2001, financial 
data have been converted from the former Spanish currency (pesetas) to euros.  
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total number of full-time equivalent workers, on the other. It is not possible to break these 
costs down into subcategories (i.e., such as labor or maintenance costs). The price of labor 
and maintenance should be positive. The price of capital (PC) is obtained by amortizing 
the costs of all concessionaire investments related to motorway length. This variable 
divides the other price input and the total costs.  
On the output side, the literature considers two main groups: supply- and demand- related 
measures. Supply measures, such as network length multiplied by the number of lanes, 
are the most suitable. However, the relative homogeneity of motorways and the absence 
of available data mean this is not an option available to us. On the demand side, the 
number of vehicles is a key determinant. However, several concessionaires have more 
than one motorway, or there can be marked differences on the same motorway in terms 
of average daily traffic, depending on the measurement point. For this reason, the output 
(Y) variable opted for is vehicle-kilometers, which accounts for the distance travelled by 
every vehicle. It should be noted that this demand indicator reflects consumer preferences, 
above and beyond the objectives of the concessionaire under control. The expected sign 
is positive, that is, an increase in the number of vehicles and in the distance travelled 
should result in higher total costs for the concessionaire. However, we call into question 
whether the addition of more vehicles would result in a stronger relation with total costs. 
As for the network characteristics, total motorway length (LEN) captures the network 
size. We expect a positive relation between motorway length and total costs. One variable 
of network quality is the number of accidents suffered by the concession (ACC). The 
concessionaire has incentives to minimize the number of road accidents since they result 
in emergency costs, traffic jams and a lower user-perceived quality. A second variable of 
network quality is the number of customer complaints received by the concession (CLA) 
over the years, the majority of customer claims are related to traffic congestion, the toll 
system, road signs, and the toll tariff, among others. We expect a positive sign for both 
quality indicators; that is, total costs should increase if the number of accidents increases 
or the quality of the motorway service is poor.  
The time trend should capture technological progress. Here, we would expect a negative 
sign because, although this sector is not characterized by significant changes in 
production technology, after several years a certain technical progress can be expected. 
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On the production function side, the dependent variable is vehicle-kilometers. The 
concessionaire minimizes inputs in order to achieve maximum output. We consider the 
total number of full-time equivalent workers as labor input (L) and motorway investment 
as capital (K), adjusted using the Spanish CPI. The network characteristics – the 
motorway length (LEN), number of accidents with victims (ACC), and the number of 
customer complaints (CLA) – and the time trend are as defined in the cost function.  
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the concessionaires. Information for total costs, 
inputs, vehicle-kilometers, network length, number of road accident victims, and the 
number of claims includes the mean, standard deviation, and first and third quartiles. Two 
large concessionaires (ACESA and AUMAR) can be characterized as outliers (there 
being a close coincidence between their mean and third quartile values).   
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
1st 
quartile 
3rd 
quartile 
Total costs (€) 28.5·106 37.4·106 8·106 30·106 
Number of workers 206.35 271.35 69.5 220 
Capital invested (€) 596·109 591·109 229·109 832·109 
Vehicle-kilometers (km) 846·106 1440·106 121·106 805·106 
Length (km) 124.89 138.68 43.1 112.6 
Number of accidents with victims 77.06 130.37 6 83 
Customer complaints 100 million veh-km 26.24 63.32 4.67 19.16 
Note: All monetary values are in 2002 euros 
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5. RESULTS 
5.1. Cost function results 
The regression results of the model specified in Eq. 6 are presented in Table 3. Since all 
variables are expressed in logarithms and normalized on the mean, the coefficients can 
be interpreted as elasticities. The original values of the monetary variables are deflated 
by a price index.  
 
Table 3: Stochastic estimates of total cost function parameter  
Variables 
Pitt and Lee (1981) True Fixed Effects True Random Effects 
Kumbhakar, Lien and 
Hartaker (2014) 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
𝛽𝑃𝐿 0.575*** (0.0082) 0.458*** (0.0120) 0.454*** (0.0113) 0.566*** (0.0086) 
𝛽𝑌 0.145*** (0.0419) 0.206*** (0.0291) 0.215*** (0.0186) 0.195*** (0.0359) 
𝛽𝐿𝐸𝑁 0.486*** (0.0461) 0.464*** (0.0821) 0.516*** (0.0170) 0.502*** (0.0360) 
β𝐴𝐶𝐶  0.0142 (0.0201) -0.003 (0.0127) -0.003 (0.0108) 0.011 (0.0209) 
𝛽𝐶𝐿𝐴 0.046** (0.0206) 0.0141 (0.0116) 0.0141* (0.0074) 0.038** (0.0184) 
𝛽T -0.002 (0.0014) -0.006*** (0.0007) -0.006*** (0.0007) -0.004*** (0.0013) 
Constant -0.424*** (0.0476)   -0.086*** (0.00996) -0.0001*** (0.0347) 
𝜎𝑢  0.440*** (0.0707) 0.106*** (0.0074) 0.107*** (0.0071) 0.389*** (0.0851) 
𝜎𝑣 0.119*** (0.0042) 0.0246*** (0.0050) 0.0288*** (0.0097) 0.125*** (0.0061) 
λ= 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎𝑣
2 3.698*** (0.0704) 4.316*** (0.0112) 3.707*** (0.0084) 3.112***  (0.0351) 
Log likelihood 248.3 455.1 373.7  
Observations 437 437 437 437 
Significance levels: * 10 per cent; ** 5 per cent; *** 1 per cent 
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The main variables present the expected sign and are statistically significant. Output is 
significant and positive, in line with microeconomic theory. A 1% increase in vehicle-
kilometers means total costs increase by between 0.15 and 0.22%, depending on the 
specification. This range is in the low band, but is quite logical given the cost structure of 
this sector (costs for an extra car tend to be marginal). The labor and maintenance input 
price is between 0.45 and 0.58, while the labor and maintenance costs account for between 
45 and 58% of total costs.  
Motorway length is a significant and positive network parameter that impacts on the 
concessionaires’ total costs – a one percent increase in total motorway length increases 
total costs by between 0.46 and 0.52%. This is also an expected outcome in the network 
industry, as total costs are more important if the network length is increased than if the 
total distance travelled by motorway users rises. The marginal effect on total costs of an 
extra vehicle per distance travelled is between two and five times less than extending the 
motorway by the same proportion. The number of accidents with victims is non-
significant in all models, indicating that the number of total accidents does not affect total 
motorway costs. However, the remaining network characteristic, the number of claims, 
has a positive sign and is significant in some specifications. If the number of claims 
increases by one percent, total costs increase by around 0.01 and 0.05%, probably as a 
result of the additional expenditure that has to be borne by the concessionaire in 
responding to these claims.   
The time trend is negative in all models except in that of Pitt and Lee (1981), where it is 
non-significant. In the TFE and TRE models, there is a 0.6% decrease in total costs every 
year, while the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model estimates a 0.4% decrease in total costs 
each year. This result is in line with that reported by Benfratello et al. (2009). In common 
with these authors, this can reasonably be accounted for in terms of the introduction of 
automatic toll systems, which reduce labor costs, and by the increase in management 
experience obtained over time. However, given the relatively small values of the 
coefficients, they do not represent structural industry changes.  
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Table 4. Scale and density economies 
Variables 
Pitt and Lee 
(1981) 
True Fixed 
Effects 
True Random 
Effects 
Kumbhakar, Lien and 
Hartaker (2014) 
Economies of 
density 
6.887 4.844 4.642 5.120 
Economies of 
scale 
1.585 1.493 1.367 1.435 
 
Table 4 shows that both economies of density and scale are found, which points to 
unexploited economies. The values, however, are higher for economies of density, 
indicating that an increase in the number of vehicles has greater effects than extending 
the motorway network. In other words, a more intensive use of a given motorway would 
lower the average cost considerably more than by extending it. However, recall that 
increasing the number of vehicle-kilometers is usually beyond the capabilities of the 
concessionaires. The variation across the parameters of economies of density can be 
attributed to the unobserved network effects, which are partially correlated with output 
and motorway length.  
One of the reasons for estimating a stochastic cost frontier is to obtain the inefficiency 
parameters. The parameter lambda indicates the ratio of the inefficiency terms to the 
random noise term. The value of 𝑢𝑖𝑡 has to be positive in order to calculate the inefficiency 
term. Likewise, if 𝜆 is statistically significant, there is evidence of “cost” inefficiency in 
the data. For all models, this parameter is highly significant and positive. Table 5 presents 
the descriptive statistics of the inefficiency estimates obtained from the different models. 
This inefficiency is calculated as the excess operational costs of a given concessionaire 
in relation to those of the optimal concessionaire. In general, most of the higher 
inefficiency values are obtained with the Pitt and Lee (1981) model, while the lowest 
values are obtained with the TRE model, which is in line with results published elsewhere 
(Farsi et al., 2006). In the Pitt and Lee model, the unobserved firm-specific differences 
are interpreted as inefficiency, which suggests higher overestimated inefficiency values. 
The TRE model separates the stochastic inefficiency term from the firm-specific 
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heterogeneity, adding a firm-specific term that captures this inefficiency. The TFE model 
provides the same interpretation as that of the TRE model, while the inefficiency value 
obtained lies between that of the Pitt and Lee and the TRE models. The residual or 
transient inefficiency is captured by the TRE and TFE models, transient inefficiency by 
the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model, allocative efficiency by the Pitt and Lee model and 
the persistent part by the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model. The inefficiency within the 
transient and persistent specifications are correlated, while between both groups there is 
no correlation. The only discordant point is provided by the TRE model, which shows no 
relation with the other transient efficiency estimations.  
Table 5: Cost efficiency measures 
Model Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Pitt and Lee (1981) .7815 .15937 .41623 .9797 
True Fixed Effects .9079 .10156 .2499 .9940 
True Random Effects .9821 .03235 .5736    1.036 
KLH (2014) transient .8944 .06365 .5291 .9797 
KLH (2014) persistent .8836 .04200 .7646 .9460 
KLH (2014) .7905 .07284 .4739 .9118 
 
Figure 1. Cost efficiency indicators: correlation and scatterplot 
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5.2. Production function results 
The stochastic production function estimators are shown in Table 6.  
Table 6: Stochastic estimates of production function parameter  
 Pitt and Lee (1981) True Fixed Effects True Random Effects 
Kumbhakar, Lien and 
Hartaker (2014) 
 Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
Coefficient
s 
Standard 
error 
Coefficient
s 
Standard 
error 
𝛽𝐿𝐴𝐵 0.359*** (0.0389) 0.416*** (0.0011) 0.437*** (0.0308) 0.401*** (0.0378) 
β𝐾  -0.035** (0.0153) -0.053*** (0.0001) -0.058** (0.0185) -0.032** (0.0220) 
𝛽𝐿𝐸𝑁 0.395*** (0.045) 0.442*** (0.0008) 0.434*** (0.0515) 0.339*** (0.0558) 
β𝐴𝐶𝐶  0.087*** (0.022) 0.031** (0.0004) 0.064*** (0.0185) 0.103*** (0.0220) 
𝛽𝐶𝐿𝐴 -0.259*** (0.0185) -0.093*** (0.0002) -0.172*** (0.0259) -0.257*** (0.0180) 
𝛽T 0.016*** (0.0013) 0.013*** (0.0001) 0.015*** (0.0015) 0.016*** (0.0013) 
Constant 0.236*** (0.0460)   -0.136*** (0.0374) -0.258*** (0.0507) 
𝜎𝑢  0.590*** (0.0795) 0.162*** (0.0094) 0.111*** (0.0095) 0.512***  (0.0001) 
𝜎𝑣 0.129*** (0.0045) 3·10
-8 (0.0064) 0.069*** (0.0067) 0.108***  (0.0131) 
λ= 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎𝑣
2 4.557*** (0.0805) 4784435*** (0.0776) 1.622*** (0.0164) 3.038*** (…) 
Log likelihood 205.3 357.1 235.3  
Observations 436 436 436 436 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The two main inputs in our production function are labor and capital. The number of 
workers is positive and significant; that is, an increase in labor affects vehicle-kilometers. 
A 1% increase in labor implies a 0.36 to 0.44% increase in vehicle-kilometers. In contrast, 
the amount of capital invested is negative and significant for all specifications. This result, 
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at first sight counterintuitive, implies that an increase in the stock of capital is related to 
less motorway use. This result is examined below in the policy section to explain the 
current financial problems faced by many toll motorway concessionaires today.  
Motorway length has a positive and significant effect on output. Logically, an increase in 
total length means that more vehicles travel on the network and/or they drive longer 
distances. Here, there are notable variations across specifications (ranging from 0.34 to 
0.44). 
Two motorway concession quality variables are included in the analysis. The number of 
accidents with victims is positively related to output; that is, a higher volume of traffic on 
a motorway is related to an increase in the accident rate. However, the number of 
customer complaints negatively affects concessionaire output. Drivers’ perception is that 
of poorer motorway quality and so use it less, while a higher number of accidents is 
unrelated to a reduction in traffic volume. Motorway users seem to have little awareness 
of accidents, but if the toll system underperforms or motorway maintenance is poor, they 
opt to use the infrastructure less. The magnitude of the coefficients differs for both quality 
variables, indicating that a 1% increase in the number of complaints results in a larger 
output reduction than the corresponding increase due to a 1% rise in the number of 
accidents with victims. The time trend is positive and significant across all specifications, 
there having been an advance in technology of around 1.3-1.6% per year between 1988 
and 2015. Note that the rate of motorization (number of vehicles/1000 pop.) doubled 
between 1990 and 2014 with an average annual growth rate of 2.9%.  
Table 7. Production efficiency measures 
Model Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Pitt and Lee (1981) .7660 .13536 .4623 .9836 
True Fixed Effects .8606 .12113 .3159 .9999 
True Random Effects .8801 .10105 .3642 .9770 
KLH (2014) transient .9008 .04854 .6011 .9805 
KLH (2014) persistent .6259 .16035 .2617 1 
KLH (2014) .5644 .1490 .1573 .9598 
 
In the case of the efficiency estimators, the TFE, TRE and the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) 
transient efficiency estimates show higher values than those reported for the cost function 
(Table 7). As expected, there is a low correlation between the persistent and transient 
efficiency specifications (Figure 2). However, the Pitt and Lee (1981) and the Kumbhakar 
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et al. (2014) persistent estimates show a clear correlation, as do the models that estimate 
transient efficiency, with Spearman correlations ranging between 0.79 and 0.87. Thus, 
within groups there is a strong correlation, and the TRE model performs well in 
comparison with the cost specification reported above. This result indicates that part of 
the inefficiency is due to input allocations that are not easily change, such as the capital 
stock.  
Figure 2. Production efficiency indicators correlation and scatterplot 
 
The different results obtained with regard to transient and persistent efficiency, both in 
the case of the production and cost frontiers, need to be tested to determine the respective 
impacts of regulation and ownership in the motorway sector. 
6. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 
The inefficiency estimation allows us to test whether or not there are differences in the  
inefficiency values related to the characteristics of the various motorway concessionaires. 
To do so we adopt as our statistical tool the Kruskal-Wallis test. This is a rank-based 
nonparametric that can be used to determine if there are statistically significant 
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from each group is equally likely to be above or below a random observation from another 
group. Unlike the ANOVA test of equality of means, the Kruskal-Wallis can be seen as 
a comparison of the mean ranks. However, the Kruskal-Wallis test does not provide the 
mean differences, which means a second test, such as the ANOVA test, is needed to 
confirm the mean value differences. As post hoc tests are run to confirm where the 
differences occurred between groups, they should only be run when there is an overall 
significant difference in group means. 
6.1. Regulatory reforms 
Although initial toll prices depend on each specific concession contract and the winning 
bid,11 any price update is determined by a common regulatory framework for all 
concessions. Before 2001, national legislation introduced a general rule providing for 
automatic, yearly price adjustments based on inflation, a widely employed regulation in 
this industry (Iossa, 2015). As Bel and Fageda (2005) report, prices increased at a rate of 
95% of the retail price index (RPI). However, this regulation was reformed in 2001 with 
a shift from the inflation link to a more sophisticated price cap regulation (RPI-X). This  
more complex, detailed price regulation was introduced when the presence of private toll 
motorways increased due to new concession awards and the plan to privatize the National 
Motorway Company (Albalate, Bel and Fageda, 2009). Even though a price cap formula 
was introduced, the typical X factor, which is commonly attributed to the target of 
efficiency gains (Bernstein and Sappington, 1999; Sappington, 2002), was simply the 
deviation between the expected and real traffic received by each concession. The 
predicted traffic volume was included in the economic and financial plan for the 
concession, as approved by the government (Albalate, Bel and Fageda, 2009). However, 
different bounding rules within the industry remained, leaving old concessions less 
constrained (Bel and Fageda, 2005). Thus, the new regulatory framework combined 
inflation and traffic deviations to update tolls.  
To analyze the impact of the regulation, we create a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one for years after 2001, and 0 otherwise. In order to capture the regulatory impact more 
                                                 
11 Note that the typical bidding process is based on a minimum price auction, in which for given technical 
standards and a fixed length of concession, the firm making the lowest toll bid obtains the concession.  
26 
 
accurately, we restrict the sample to the period 1998 through 2003. Although a price cap 
regulation affecting public utilities is usually expected to provide efficiency gains with 
respect to other forms of price regulation, the specific design of the X factor in the Spanish 
motorway industry might not necessarily provide incentives to improve productivity. 
According to the categories of tariff adjustment regulation of Iossa (2015), this regulation 
lies somewhere between the price cap regulation and the banded rate regulation, because 
tariffs are updated to take into account earning and risk sharing objectives due to traffic 
fluctuations, which are partly exogenous and beyond the control of the concessionaire.  
Table 8 summarizes mean concessionaire efficiency for both groups and the mean 
difference results from the Kruskal-Wallis test. In the case of the transient efficiency 
models, introducing the price cap scheme results in a better concessionaire performance, 
with the exception of two production specifications. The mean difference test shows that 
for four of the specifications there is a statistically better performance as a result of the 
introduction of the price cap introduction, whereas in two specifications there are no 
differences between the groups.12 The price cap scheme seems to have a much more 
marked effect on technical efficiency on the production side than it does on the cost side 
(all technical efficiencies on the production frontiers are statistically different while only 
one out of three are on the cost frontiers).  
Thus, even if the X factor of the price cap regulation does not identify a productivity 
target, its composition provides better incentives than inflation adjustments. Under an 
adjustment system based on inflation, concessionaires are fully protected from input price 
increases, while under price cap regulation their protection diminishes by the correction 
produced by the deviations between actual and predicted demand. Thus, concessionaires 
have more incentives to contain input costs. The evidence provided in Table 8 seems to 
support this hypothesis. On the production side, note that the price cap regulation 
produces lower toll increases in concessions that have received higher actual traffic with 
respect to forecasts, in order to limit monopoly profits and transfer risk to road users. 
However, as prices increase less than they do in other concessions that may set higher 
                                                 
12 The analysis was also conducted for the whole sample (1988-2014) and the difference between the price- 
cap years and those prior to them are statistically significant at the 1% level on all four specifications, while 
the other two non-significant efficiency difference groups are maintained 
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prices because their actual traffic is similar or closer to forecasts, traffic – the outcome 
variable – may still increase more in the former concessionaires that apply stricter toll 
increases due to the negative price elasticity of demand.13  
Table 8. Mean efficiency and Kruskal-Wallis test on price cap scheme 
 Prod Eff 
TFE 
Cost Eff 
TFE 
Prod Eff 
TRE 
Cost Eff 
TRE 
Prod Eff KLH 
residual 
Cost Eff KLH 
residual 
Mean efficiency 
Dpricecap=0 (n=23) 
0.8363 0.8625 0.8689 0.9867 0.8986 0.8778 
Mean efficiency 
Dpricecap=1 (n=70) 
0.8970 0.9003 0.9067 0.9841 0.9153 0.9003 
𝜒1
2-value 6.229 5.797 3.824 0.102 3.968 2.635 
p-value 0.0126 0.0161 0.0505 0.7491 0.0464 0.1046 
 
6.2. Central vs. regional granting authorities. 
A further characteristic of the Spanish motorway industry is that it reflects the political 
decentralization of the State, so that we find that both central and regional authorities have 
awarded toll motorway concessions. Although toll motorway regulation falls under 
national legislation enacted by the Spanish Parliament (Congreso de los Diputados) – and 
as a result there are no major differences in this respect, regional authorities can allocate 
resources, decide which projects are to be awarded, design the motorway technical project 
and specify the features of the concession contracts. Thus, efficiency differences may 
arise from the scope granted to the regional authorities by national legislation. Because 
we can differentiate as to whether the motorway is promoted (or the concession contract 
is awarded) by the central government or not, we decided to test the efficiency 
implications of this.  
                                                 
13 Matas and Raymond (2003) evaluate the price elasticity of toll motorway concessionaires in Spain finding 
a short-run elasticity of -0.3 and a long-run elasticity of -0.5. 
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We create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the motorway is promoted/granted 
by the central government authority and 0 otherwise. In our case, motorways not granted 
by the central government can only have been promoted by regional governments.14   
Table 9 shows the mean efficiency by group and the Kruskal-Wallis values for the 
persistent efficiency estimation. We found empirical evidence that motorways promoted 
by regional authorities are more efficient than those promoted by the central authority in 
three specifications, whereas we find no statistical differences for persistent efficiency in 
the production function in the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) specification. However, when 
performing the same analysis for models in which inefficiency does not absorb 
unobserved heterogeneity (TRE, TFE and KLH residual), we obtain non-statistical 
differences between groups for the six specifications. This result seems to support the 
argument that lower tiers of government allocate resources for motorways better, 
probably due to a better selection of projects and the avoidance of white elephants. 
Indeed, the current financial crisis in the industry in Spain only affects motorways 
awarded by the central government and, according to Albalate et al. (2015), their main 
problems are linked to project selection issues: route choices, overcapacity and above all, 
low actual demand. All these elements have resulted in large gaps between capacity and 
demand, generating financial stress. This trend is easily identifiable in the descriptive 
statistics for our sample. Although regional motorways are more expensive per km, their 
revenues per km double those awarded by central government. Motorway concessionaires 
appointed by regional authorities have invested an average of 8.36 million euros per km, 
while those appointed by the central government have invested just 6.82 million euros 
per km. This difference (22.6%) can be attributed to the worse land conditions and 
geological difficulties that regional motorways faced in their construction phase. 
Moreover, regional motorways receive higher volumes of road users recording an average 
of 0.898 million per km, whereas the central government motorway concessionaires 
receive an average of just 0.416. 
In contrast, there is no empirical evidence of different management performance on these 
motorways as regards residual efficiency. Thus, regional authorities do not seem to select 
                                                 
14 We include as regional governments the Diputaciones, the public administration operating at the province 
level. This tier of administration lies between local and regional governments.   
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better managers (private concessionaires or themselves) nor do they appear to provide 
better management incentives than those provided by the central authority.   
Table 9. Mean efficiency and Kruskal-Wallis test on motorway granting authority 
 
Prod Eff Pitt 
and Lee 
Cost Eff Pitt 
and Lee 
Prod Eff KLH 
persistent 
Cost Eff KLH 
persistent 
Mean efficiency 
Dcentral=0 (n=206) 
0.7999 0.8504 0.6132 0.8930 
Mean efficiency 
Dcentral=1 (n=328) 
0.7466 0.7421 0.6308 0.8798 
𝜒1
2-value 17.031 26.190 0.009 2.852 
p-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.9243 0.0913 
 
6.3. Ownership models 
Although the motorway industry in Spain is based primarily on private participation, there 
is some public participation in some of the concessionaires. The impact that public entities 
have as shareholders on efficiency can be tested in the same way as above. Thus, we 
create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there is public participation in a 
concessionaire in a specific year, and 0 otherwise. In the case of the transient efficiency 
estimations, five of the six tests show no statistical differences. The one exception is in 
the case of the cost efficiency estimations using the TRE model, where private 
concessionaires are estimated to be more efficient.15 Given that the residual efficiency 
results are not clear, we decided to examine the ownership issue in greater depth by 
creating different variables.  
Table 10 summarizes all the Kruskal-Wallis results from the transient specifications for 
the different ownership dummy groups. In the first group, public participation is divided 
between central and regional governments. Restricting the sample concessions to those 
                                                 
15 Persistent inefficiency models are time invariant, which means that changes in the public/private 
composition of shareholders cannot be absorbed in the efficiency variations. 
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with public participation, we then create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
participation is regional and 0 otherwise (central government). The results for the six 
specifications indicate that regional governments are more efficient than the central 
government when they are concessionaire shareholders. In the next group, we compare 
private ownership vs. central government ownership, omitting regional government 
participation. For all specifications, except that of cost efficiency in the TRE model, the 
performance of central government is less efficient than that of private-owned firms. In 
short, firms owned by central government underperform in comparison with all other 
concessionaire types. 
We also compared regional and private companies, omitting concessionaires with a 
central government participation. In four of the specifications, there are no statistically 
significant differences between regional and private firms. However, in the case of 
production efficiency with the TFE model and in that of cost efficiency with the TRE 
model, there is statistical evidence indicating that regional government participation is 
more efficient than that of fully private concessionaires. Given these overall results, we 
need to be cautious in drawing any conclusions and would suggest that there is no 
difference in their respective performances. This result is confirmed when we create two 
groups from the whole sample: regional government shareholders, on the one hand, and 
private and central government shareholders, on the other. We create a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if a regional government participates as a shareholder in the 
concessionaire, and 0 otherwise. The results for transient efficiency show non-statistical 
differences between regional shareholders in management vs central government/private 
concessionaires. The only discordant result is that of cost efficiency in the TRE model, 
where regional level participation implies a better managerial performance.16 These 
results indicate that the management of concessions by regional governments is on a par 
with that of private concessionaires.  
To sum up, public ownership participation does not result in better management 
efficiency than that provided by private concessionaires. However, regional governments 
perform better than central government, but at the same level as that of private 
                                                 
16 Recall the TRE model tends to give discordant efficiency estimations. 
31 
 
concessionaires. In short, central government capital participation seems to be associated 
with the relatively inefficient ownership model.  
6.4 Privatization  
Having tested the role played by public ownership, we turn our attention to the 
privatization process. Some concessionaires were nationalized in 1984 by the central 
government (i.e., Audasa, Aucalsa, Audenasa and Austroestradas) only to be fully or 
partially privatized again by public auction in 2003. This means we are able to test 
whether the ownership models present any differences in terms of their efficiency. In 
order to analyze the impact of privatization on management efficiency, we performed a 
Kruskal-Wallis test on the concessions that had been privatized. We create a dummy that 
takes a value of 1 if at least 50% of shares are under public ownership and 0 otherwise. 
For all model specifications, the mean level of motorway efficiency under full or partial 
public ownership is lower than that under private ownership (Table 11). A Kruskal-Wallis 
test suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis of both sub-samples having an equal mean 
efficiency level, except that of the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) specification for residual 
efficiency. As for the specific impact of privatization on efficiency, Figure 3 shows the 
evolution of residual efficiency of the privatized concessionaires. After 2003, there is 
some evidence that efficiency increased in Audasa and Aucalsa. Nonetheless, the 
evolution is not clear in the case of Audenasa, whereas in Autoestradas inefficiency 
increased after privatization. Generally, private ownership and management seem to 
improve management efficiency in Spain, whereas if we perform the same analysis for 
persistent efficiency specifications, there are no statistical differences between groups.17 
In the case of the short-term impacts of privatization, we find mixed results. This seems 
to indicate that the specific features of each concession may be relevant in terms of 
whether we might expect (or otherwise) short-term efficiency gains from privatization.   
  
                                                 
17We also performed the Kruskal-Wallis for all observations (not just the privatized concessions) and the 
results are mostly maintained for both inefficiency measures. 
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Table 10. Mean efficiency and Kruskal-Wallis test on different ownership 
Dummy 
Ownership 
comparison 
Descriptive statistics 
Prod Eff 
TFE 
Cost Eff 
TFE 
Prod Eff 
TRE 
Cost Eff TRE 
Prod Eff 
KLH 
residual 
Cost Eff 
KLH 
residual 
Regional 
vs. Central 
Mean efficiency 
Dregcentral=0  (n=28) 
0.7733 0.8845 0.8210 0.9818 0.8736 0.8639 
Mean efficiency 
Dregionalcentral=1 (n=55) 
0.8844 0.9156 0.8793 0.9915 0.9023 0.9018 
χ1
2-value 11.024 3.175 3.533 2.783 4.355 2.906 
p-value 0.0009 0.0748 0.0602 0.0953 0.0369 0.0882 
Private vs. 
Central 
Mean efficiency 
Dprivcentral=0  (n=28) 
0.7733 0.8845 0.8848 0.9803 0.9026 0.8953 
 Mean efficiency 
Dprivcentral=1 (n=354) 
0.8636 0.9086 0.8210 0.9818 0.8736 0.8684 
 χ1
2-value 8.220 4.782 4.701 2.542 5.503 4.079 
 p-value 0.0041 0.0288 0.0301 0.1094 0.0190 0.0434 
Regional 
vs. Private 
Mean efficiency 
Dregpriv=0  (n=354) 
0.8636 0.9086 0.8847 0.9803 0.9026 0.8953 
 Mean efficiency 
Dregpriv=1 (n=47) 
0.9079 0.9166 0.8885 0.9900 0.9062 0.8993 
 χ1
2-value 4.732 1.195 0.051 16.570 0.251 0.737 
 p-value 0.0296 0.2744 0.8220 0.0001 0.6164 0.3906 
Regional 
vs. Central 
and Private 
Mean efficiency 
Dregcentralpriv=0  
(n=381) 
0.8572 0.9068 0.8802 0.9805 0.9006 0.8933 
 Mean efficiency 
Dregcentralpriv=1 (n=55) 
0.8844 0.9156 0.8793 0.9915 0.9023 0.9018 
 χ1
2-value 2.162 0.822 0.0 24.306 0.333 0.073 
 p-value 0.1415 0.3646 0.9937 0.0001 0.5636 0.7866 
33 
 
 
Table 11. Mean efficiency and Kruskal-Wallis test on privatized concessions  
 Prod Eff 
TFE 
Cost Eff 
TFE 
Prod Eff 
TRE 
Cost Eff 
TRE 
Prod Eff KLH 
residual 
Cost Eff KLH 
residual 
Mean efficiency 
Dprivatized=0 (n=23) 
0.7734 0.8942 0.8454 0.9928 0.8766 0.8842 
Mean efficiency 
Dprivatized=1 (n=70) 
0.9056 0.9476 0.9170 0.9945 0.9131 0.9093 
𝜒1
2-value 15.755 5.543 7.243 11.920 5.750 0.674 
p-value 0.0001 0.0186 0.0071 0.0005 0.0165 0.4117 
 
Figure 3. Transient efficiency estimations of privatized concessions  
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper builds an empirical model, applying the framework provided by stochastic 
frontier analysis, in an effort to study the technical and cost efficiencies of Spanish toll 
motorway concessionaires. The models proposed are production and cost stochastic 
frontiers, which complement each other in terms of their parameter estimations and 
efficiency analyses. The presence of structural problems in the production process of this 
sector in Spain points to the need to undertake separate efficiency estimations. To this 
end, we estimate persistent and transient efficiency using the Pitt and Lee (1981), the true 
fixed effects, the true random effects and the Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) 
models. The estimates are conducted on panel data for the years 1988 to 2014, controlling 
for different network characteristics. The main findings of the paper can be summarized 
as: 
 Cost function estimates for the motorway industry show significant technical 
progress has been made in the order of 0.3-0.6% per year.  
 The presence of unexploited economies of scale and density, with the latter being 
much larger. Increasing the number of vehicles has a more marked effect than 
extending the Spanish motorway network. The fragmentation of the Spanish 
network, operated as it is by many concessionaires, has hindered the potential of 
network effects and, hence, the exploitation of economies of scale and density. 
The current financial crisis suffered by the industry in Spain could lead to the 
merger of various concessionaires, which could favor the further exploitation of 
economies of scale and density. 
 On the production function side, a slightly negative relation is found between 
capital stock and vehicles. This may account for the overinvestment in the sector 
that has placed the industry under considerable financial stress.  
 The efficiency estimations show no relation between transient and persistent 
efficiency. This highlights the importance of estimating both for policy purposes 
and for recommendations. Transient efficiency is greater than persistent efficiency 
because of the non-competitive environment of motorways and the allocation of 
inputs. 
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 The price cap regulation introduced in 2001 increased the transient efficiency of 
the production function, while on the cost side no significant difference in 
performance was recorded.  
 Lower tiers of government (regional) in their role as granting authorities seem to 
allocate resources for motorways better. This probably reflects their ability to 
select viable projects and to avoid white elephants. Better persistent efficiency 
levels are found in the case of concessionaires appointed by regional authorities; 
however, on the management efficiency side no significant differences are found 
across the tiers of government. Note that all the concessionaires presenting signs 
of financial stress were appointed by the central government.  
 No differences are found between public and private ownership models, except in 
the case of central government participation. This resulted in greater inefficiency 
than in the case of regional participation and full private ownership.   
 Most motorway concessionaires that have been privatized increased their transient 
efficiency after privatization, lending some limited support to efficiency gains 
achieved through privatization in the short run. However, this finding needs to be 
treated with caution given the small sample considered.   
All in all, therefore, this paper demonstrates the power of production and cost stochastic 
frontier panel data techniques as a tool not only for measuring efficiency but also for 
evaluating public policies in terms of their efficiency outcomes. Besides this, our main 
results on regulatory and ownership reforms provide highly pertinent insights for those 
implementing transport policy. It is our firm belief that the methodology employed here 
offers great potential to regulators and policy evaluation bodies working in the field of 
transportation. Although few studies of this kind, in which two types of efficiency are 
measured, have been reported to date, we expect to see considerably more in the future 
given their huge potential for refining the analysis and evaluation of public policy 
efficiency.  
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